Volume 11, Nos. 11 and 12 November-December, 1983

FOCUS

From the *Why Not?* to the *How To*

Now that Jackson has declared his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination, supporters and opponents alike wonder: How will Jesse run?

Shelving Immigration Reform

Scuttling Simpson-Mazzoli, Tip O'Neill asks: "Is there any real constituency for the bill?"

Foreign Trade Policy and Unemployment

U.S. protectionism will be a hot issue in the 1984 campaign. What does it have to do with blacks? Plenty.

Plus—

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Perspective

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During the past 12 months, the black vote has been endowed with a respect long sought but never before received. It now looms as the wild card or the "X factor" in the 1984 elections. A number of developments account for this turn of events.

A string of recent mayoral victories (Harold Washington in Chicago, Wilson Goode in Philadelphia, Harvey Gantt in Charlotte, and James Sharp in Flint) and Jesse Jackson's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination are sometimes cited as the cause of the recent upsurge in black political participation. But these developments are the result of a movement much bigger than the candidates.

In the 1982 mid-term elections, black voter participation increased 6 percent over 1978, while white participation increased 3 percent. As a result, the gap between black and white turnout, normally 10-15 percentage points, was reduced to 7 points, the smallest ever. Looking at the 1982 returns another way, black voters contributed crucially to the winning margins of the governors of New York and Texas and the victories of 21 black members of the House of Representatives (an all-time high). They also sent some House members home, most notably several conservative Republicans in the South. Now, more than a year later, we can look back on the political activism in 1982 as the tip of an iceberg headed for the 1984 elections.

What accounts for this upsurge in political participation? The conventional wisdom is that the Reagan administration is the catalyst. A Gallup poll last year showed that nonwhite disapproval of President Reagan's job performance exceeded approval by a whopping 77 to 12 percent.

But is this the only reason for the upsurge? I think not. It does not give proper credit to the strong, attractive black candidates running in both 1982 and 1983—both winners and losers (Tom Bradley, Robert Clark, and Mel King, to name a few). Nor does this thesis give due credit to the charismatic Reverend Jackson, who was preaching voter registration long before he was seeking the Democratic nomination.

There were also a number of very successful voter mobilization campaigns. Certainly, the continuing, often unheralded efforts of the National Coalition on Black Voter Participation, the Voter Education Project, the NAACP, National Urban League, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference—not to mention PUSH—made an enormous contribution to increased political awareness and participation.

To all these factors—Reaganomics, black candidates, voter mobilization programs—still one more must be added. It is the quiet determination of blacks to use the political process as a vehicle for self-help, social change, and economic survival.

This new political activism beats in the bosom of the community, and that is good. We control it—not the administration, not the candidates, not the mobilizers. And when we decide to sharpen our political participation as the new cutting edge of the civil rights movement, we become a force to be reckoned with.

In a way, Harold Washington and Jesse Jackson, as well as many others, tapped into this new political circuitry that predated their candidacies. The community was in search of leaders. These candidates filled a vacuum.

Thus, regardless of the political outcome in 1984, one large gain has already been made: We know we can make a difference and that we have candidates with "the right stuff."

We know there is hope when the grass roots and the bourgeoisie are both turned on by the prospect of a black presidential candidate; when black staff from foundations, academia, and corporations volunteer to help develop a policy framework for racial justice; when black elected officials from *all* levels of government—not just the highly visible leaders—meet to discuss issues and strategies (see page 8) and when a woman from Tucson writes me with these questions:

"What can I do to establish an active campaign here? How would I go about getting the necessary funds, and how can we establish a program to register people and take registered voters to the polls on election day?"

Eddie N. Williams
President

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Jesse Jackson: Why Not? to How To

by Thomas E. Cavanagh

(The author is a research associate at the Joint Center.)

Jesse Jackson ended months of speculation by declaring his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination on November 3.

Accompanied by a diverse array of political leaders and activists, Jackson announced before an enthusiastic crowd of 2,000 his determination to move from the "Why Not?" to the "How To?" "The voice of duty has whispered 'thou must,' " Jackson told his listeners.

Jackson proclaimed, in a speech that flowed with the religious cadences of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, that the black experience uniquely encompasses "the experience and perspective of the rejected. . . . Thus, our perspective encompasses and includes more of the American people and their interests than do most other experiences."

Campaign Strategy

Although Jackson's call for a "rainbow coalition" of blacks, Hispanics, women, and others has become a hallmark of his campaign, his political base is still the black community; consequently, he will probably target a half-dozen or so Deep South states, Illinois, New York, and the District of Columbia—areas with sizeable black populations and, thus, greater likelihood of electing Jackson delegates.

Most estimates of the total number of delegates Jackson can win range between 100 and 400; political analysts generally agree that in order to fall within this span, he would have to carry at least half of the black vote. The *Chicago Sun-Times*, in a computer simulation of possible scenarios for the primaries, found that the largest block of black Jackson delegates would come from Illinois, because of that state's party rules, and three heavily black Congressional Districts on the South Side. But there is talk of Chicago Mayor Harold Washington running as a favorite son candidate there, so the situation is somewhat complex.

Registration, Representation, and Reagan

Jackson has preferred to emphasize aspects of the campaign other than the acquisition of delegates. A key issue for Jackson is black voting rights in the South. He intends to push the Democratic party, both nationally and in individual southern states, to eliminate run-off primaries, at-large elections, racial gerrymandering, annexation, and inconvenient registration requirements.

Jackson also hopes to encourage more black candidates to run for office in the coming year, confident that an increased registration and turnout of black voters will improve these candidates' chances for nomination and election. "I plan to have the longest and widest coattails of any candidate in this race," he declared.

In a concluding outline of his vision for the nation, Jackson erected the battle lines between himself and Ronald Reagan. His opening salvo: "For nearly four years, our nation has had to endure the substitution of showmanship and acting for statesmanship and positive leadership." What followed was a pledge to contest the president's policies on several domestic and international issues from economic initiatives to diplomatic and military undertakings.

How Will Jesse Run?

The question on everyone's mind now is, how will Jackson translate his powerful appeal into powerful action on the part of voters? To date, only the outlines of his campaign structure are clear.

Arnold Pinkney, a partner in a Cleveland insurance agency, has been named the campaign's national director. A former president of the Cleveland school board, Pinkney served as a deputy director of Hubert Humphrey's 1972 campaign, and has also organized in Ohio for Jimmy Carter, Governor Richard Celeste, and Congressman Louis Stokes (D, East Cleveland).

The co-chairmen of the Jackson Finance Committee will be George E. Johnson, chairman of Johnson Products, Inc., and Percy Sutton, former Manhattan borough president and currently the chairman of Inner City Broadcasting Company. Samuel Foggie, chairman of the board of the black-owned United National Bank of Washington (D.C.), is serving as campaign treasurer.

(The Joint Center is currently preparing an in-depth, updated analysis of the electoral situation Jesse Jackson will face in the primaries. The paper will be available by the end of the year.)

In the Reverend's Own Words

"This day we gather strangely exhuberant and hopeful amidst so much chaos, confusion, despair, and pain. We sense that we are part of a special moment in history, pregnant with possibility. We courageously press forward for we dare not abort this moment. We are destined to redirect the course of this nation and we shall. We have been hoping against hope, on this journey from slaveship to championship, that the stars in their courses have directed us to this station today. We are here to heed the call of this nation's highest and noblest principles that we might fulfill our mission to defend the poor, make welcome the outcast, deliver the needy, and be the source of hope for people yearning to be free everywhere."

"This candidacy is not for blacks only. This is a national campaign growing out of the black experience and seen through the eyes of a black perspective—which is the experience and perspective of the rejected. Because of this experience, I can empathize with the plight of Appalachia because I have known poverty. I know the pain of anti-Semitism because I have felt the humiliation of discrimination. I know firsthand the shame of bread lines and the horror of hopelessness and despair because my life has been dedicated to empowering the world's rejected to become respected. Thus, our perspective encompasses and includes more of the American people and their interests than do most other experiences."

Shelving Immigration Reform

by Milton D. Morris

(Dr. Morris is director of research at the Joint Center. His major study of immigration issues will be published by the Brookings Institution next year.)

On October 4, 1983, House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill announced that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (the Simpson-Mazzoli bill) would not be considered by the House this year, bringing to an abrupt end several years of Congressional effort to enact immigration reform. The bill had been approved overwhelmingly (80-19) by the Senate in August 1982; the House debated its version of this bill during the last days of the 97th Congress but set it aside owing to a lack of time to resolve major complications. In May 1983, a majority of the Senate (76-18) again passed and sent to the House another—identical—immigration reform bill. An extensively revised version of this second bill was the one shelved by the Speaker.

An Unsurprising Decision

For those familiar with the complexities of immigration politics, the bill's failure is not entirely surprising. Immigration policy has always been excruciatingly difficult to enact. The country has been deeply ambivalent about immigration—proud of its tradition of receptivity to immigrants and committed to the right of individuals to migrate, yet fearful of immigration's potential ill effects. Furthermore, many of the measures used or proposed for controlling immigration appear to threaten jealously guarded civil rights and liberties of both the aliens involved and some segments of the domestic population. And a complex array of often conflicting domestic and foreign policy interests are bound up with the immigration issue.

All of these forces were evident in the attempt to enact the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, whose primary purpose was to solve the widely acknowledged problem of illegal immigration. The Senate version imposed a new, more inclusive ceiling of 425,000 on annual immigration; sought to improve the process by which petitions and disputes, especially asylum and refugee claims, are adjudicated; and adopted two measures to deal with illegal immigration—an amnesty provision, under which all illegal immigrants in the country prior to January 1980 would be granted legal status, and an employer sanction provision, under which employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants would be subject to modest fines.

The House Judiciary Committee discarded the idea of a revised ceiling and concentrated instead on the provisions dealing with illegal immigration and reform of the adjudicative process, which, its opponents argue, does not now permit judicial review of adverse decisions. The employer sanction provisions, always the most controversial element in proposals to curtail illegal immigration, quickly became the sticking point in committee deliberations on the House side. Although many people consider such sanctions essential in any effort to curb illegal immigration, there are at least three sources of vigorous opposition to them: agricultural interests in the Southwest, which have relied for decades on illegal immigrants as seasonal workers; Latino organizations, which fear that such a provision would result in greatly increased discrimination against Latinos in the labor market; and several civil liberties and civil rights organizations, which also fear greater discrimination in the labor market. Moreover, many people outside these three alliances oppose the creation of a worker identification card, widely considered indispensable to an effective employer sanctions program.

Months of deliberation by several House committees—Judiciary; Agriculture, Education, and Labor; Energy and Commerce; and Ways and Means—failed to resolve the deep disagreements over these issues. When Speaker O'Neill refused to allow consideration of the bill, he was both acknowledging this impasse and avoiding the political cost of enacting so controversial a law on the eve of a presidential election.

Disappointed Supporters

Despite the Speaker's assertion that the immigration reform bill lacked a constituency, it clearly enjoyed wide public support. Scores of newspapers across the country had urged its adoption, and numerous public opinion polls indicated a popular desire for firm action to reduce illegal immigration. Not surprisingly, therefore, O'Neill's action has been roundly criticized by the press and by those in Congress who worked for adoption of the bill.

Journalist Carl Rowan described the action as "a blunder that could cost the Democrats far more votes than can ever be delivered by the Hispanic politicians O'Neill was trying to placate." And Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ky), who sponsored the bill in the House, complained that "the speaker's abrupt, unnecessary, thoroughly unfounded action deprives the Congress and the country of the right to deal with an issue that has plagued us for 30 years."

Both Congress's failure to enact immigration reform and the manner in which Speaker O'Neill scuttled the attempt are regrettable; the country would have been better served had the bill been brought to the House floor for consideration—even if it failed to win approval. The Speaker's assertions that he feared a politically motivated presidential veto and that any future bill should have the approval of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus are unpersuasive and disturbing. Unpersuasive because there is no evidence to suggest that the political benefits accruing to the president from a veto (were it exercised) would have exceeded gains to the Democrats for having supported the bill: disturbing because investing the Hispanic Caucus with virtual veto power over future immigration reform is imprudent and an unfair burden to impose on any single group in Congress.

The Future of Reform

The Speaker's apparent bad judgment notwithstanding, some important questions arise from his

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Foreign Trade Policy and Unemployment

by Kevin D. Armstrong

(The author is staff writer at the Joint Center for Political Studies.)

On November 3, the House of Representatives passed, by a vote of 219 to 199, so-called domestic content legislation. The controversial bill would require foreign automobile manufacturers who sell more than 100,000 cars a year in this country to use specific percentages of American parts and labor. The bill now moves to the Senate, where it is likely to be taken up early in 1984. It will face a tougher battle there, and even if it is passed, President Reagan, who has actively opposed such legislation, will probably veto it.

The bill is one of the first congressional actions in what will be a hotly contested political battle in 1984. Organized labor has succeeded in making a central issue of U.S. trade and its impact on American workers. In this article, we will explore some of the basic arguments behind the rhetoric, with special attention to their significance for blacks and other minorities.

Representation of women and minorities in U.S. industries most harmed by foreign trade, 1980.

Industry*	Women	Minorities
Apparel	80%	12%
Motor vehicles	13%	14%
Furnaces, Steel products	7%	14%
Nonrubber footwear	62%	4%
Motorcycles, Bicycles	19%	8%
Radio, TV sets	40%	8%
Broadwoven fabric mills	42%	13%
Rubber footwear	25%	10%
Petroleum refining	15%	7%
Furniture, Fixtures	27%	11%

*Industries are listed in order of business lost to imports.

Source: Data from Department of Labor

Representation of women and minorities in U.S. industries most helped by foreign trade, 1980.

Industry*	Women	Minorities
Machine shop products	16%	5%
Refrigeration machinery	16%	5%
Fabricated plate work	12%	7%
Veneer and plywood	10%	16%
Semiconductors	41%	7%
Electronic components	41%	7%
Wiring devices	41%	7%
Motors, Generators	22%	5%
Pumps and compressors	16%	5%
Special industrial machinery	14%	7%

*Industries are listed in order of business gained from export trade.

Source: Data from Department of Labor

Changing Nature of U.S. Trade

Since the early 1950s, rising global prosperity and the easing of trade restrictions have led to increased U.S. trade with both industrialized and less developed nations. These trends have altered America's economy markedly, making it considerably more dependent on world commerce: the value of imports and exports as a percentage of the gross national product bounded from 7.3 percent in 1965 to 18.4 percent in 1980.

The expansion of international trade has undoubtedly yielded increased job opportunities in American industries dependent upon exports—semiconductors, aircraft engines, and construction machinery, to name a few. But some basic U.S. industries for various reasons—ranging from the relative strength of the dollar to problems in the industries themselves—have been unsuccessful in competing with foreign imports: industries such as autos, steel, and machine tools have been severely damaged by foreign competition. (The enormous deficits in America's balance of trade over the last few years—$36.4 billion in 1982—attest to the extent of the damage.) These industries have had to reduce their work forces through temporary or permanent layoffs and plant closings. A disproportionately high number of the affected workers are black.

Trade and Minority Unemployment

According to a study prepared for the Joint Center by Dr. Jane-yu Li (an economist now at the World Bank), the U.S. Department of Labor has identified the 20 sectors hurt most by recent shifts in trading patterns and the 20 sectors that have enjoyed the greatest expansion as a result of the same shifts. The sectors most harmed by foreign competition employ relatively more minorities: in 1980, the weighted average percentage of minority workers was 11.5 for the sectors adversely affected by trade and 7.4 for the sectors that benefit from trade. The statistics for women are similar: 41.1 percent of workers in the former sector but only 21.5 percent of those in the latter were women.

What's more, the burden on minority and women workers may be much larger than these figures suggest. For example, the Department of Labor has estimated that black workers make up 14 percent of the work force in the automobile industry but 33 percent of laid-off auto workers—more than double the rate for whites.

Minorities and women, therefore, are most likely to experience—and least able to afford—the job disruption brought on by increased competition.

Competition or Protection?

Some within organized labor have called for government assistance to counter industrial decline. A position paper adopted by the Fifteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, which met last month in Hollywood, Florida, advocates emergency relief measures that "could include loans and loan guarantees, direct subsidies, targeted tax measures,

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. . . Immigration Reform

(Continued from page 4)

action: Did the country lose very much in the failure of Simpson-Mazzoli, and if so what? Where do we go from here with immigration reform?

The failure to enact Simpson-Mazzoli now means that no similar legislation is likely before 1985, since Congress will be even more reluctant to deal with the issue in 1984—a presidential election year. This delay means that the problem of illegal immigration will persist and perhaps worsen after this new evidence of the government's inability to act. Millions of people who would have been granted legal status by Simpson-Mazzoli will continue to lead a clandestine existence, and the inequitable way immigration petitions are now adjudicated will remain unchanged.

Nevertheless, the failed bill was far from adequate; it would have delivered considerably less than most press comments about it imply. Even its sponsors conceded that it had serious weaknesses and should be viewed as only a modest first step in immigration reform. The principal problem was that both House and Senate versions of the bill failed to offer a credible means of curtailing illegal immigration. The proposed employer sanctions seemed too weak to be effective especially in the absence of a reliable worker identification system or a plan to expand the responsible enforcement agencies to enforce the new provision.

The failure of Simpson-Mazzoli demonstrates the extreme difficulty of achieving major immigration reform. If the current problems worsen considerably, however, Congress may be driven to harsh and imprudent measures. But there are alternatives.

Congress might now turn its attention to passage of pending refugee legislation that could include some of the modifications in the adjudication process painstakingly worked out as part of Simpson-Mazzoli. Next, it could provide direction and funding to drastically reorganize and strengthen the immigration bureaucracy to improve services and enforcement. Congress might also review its foreign economic assistance programs to determine how they might help improve the economic conditions that contribute to the increasing emigration pressures in nearby developing countries. These measures would help to reduce illegal immigration significantly and would improve the effectiveness of future immigration reform legislation.

. . . Foreign Trade

(Continued from page 5)

and trade relief . . ." And the United Auto Workers union vigorously supports the domestic content legislation.

The unions and their supporters maintain that such measures would create jobs for Americans and "send a message" to other countries to open their markets to more American goods.

The government response has been moderate so far. Laws were enacted in 1974 and 1978 to provide some assistance to domestic industries, and the U.S. signed the internationally negotiated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which allows for the imposition of an off-setting duty when imports are being sold at "less than normal value." "Normal value" is defined as the price at which a product is sold in its domestic market or—for products manufactured solely for export—the price at which the product is sold to a third country; in cases where third country comparisons cannot be made, the normal value is defined as an item's cost of production.

Besides these antidumping duties, the most commonly used import relief measure is the negotiation of "voluntary" export restraint agreements with other nations. Some such agreements have been struck between the United States and such newly industrialized countries as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, yet they have failed to halt the slippage of America's heavy industries. More extensive remedies, therefore, continue to be advocated.

Opponents of these remedies argue that if international trade is restricted, a trade war may ensue, depriving all nations of the gains made possible by the comparative advantages of each trading partner. Among the results, they say, lower-income families in the United States would no longer benefit from lower-priced imported necessities such as clothing, shoes, consumer electronics, and cars, and minority families would suffer more than whites because of their lower incomes.

A worse consequence cited frequently by farmers' groups and other export-oriented industries is the likelihood that foreign countries would retaliate by restricting U.S. imports. Firms producing goods for export would then lose business, and although there are relatively few minority workers in these firms, these few would probably suffer job losses in the same disproportionate way that is occurring now throughout heavy industry.

Protectionist measures cannot save many jobs in heavy industry either, according to the advocates of unrestricted trade: competing domestic producers will simply increase the level of automation to cut their costs. As an example, they point to the automobile industry, which bought itself time to retool by persuading the government to negotiate a voluntary export restraint agreement with Japan. Increased automation means that jobs in the industry will probably never reach prerecession levels.

The debate over the proper U.S. response to increased competition from abroad is seen by many as a debate over the future of their livelihood. Those in the auto industry, for instance, fear the loss of sales and jobs if imports are allowed to continue unabated, while farmers fear that limitations on imported cars will lead to foreign restrictions on American agricultural exports. The struggle among these competing interests is perhaps the natural result of a changing world economic order, but it promises to be a protracted and potentially bitter confrontation.

Telescope

South Carolina Elects First Black State Senator Since Reconstruction

Reverend I. DeQuincey Newman was elected South Carolina's first black state senator since 1888, in a special election held in October. Newman, a Democrat, is a businessman and former NAACP field director for South Carolina. He defeated white Republican John Camp for the seat, which represents Richland, Fairfield, and Chester counties. It was previously held by Alex Sanders, now a chief judge of the state Court of Appeals.

AT&T Reorganization and Blacks

A CBS News/*New York Times* poll taken in late September found that 69 percent of black respondents say they could not afford a telephone if rates double. Many people have predicted just such an increase in rates as a result of the court-ordered reorganization of the telephone system scheduled to take place in January 1984. Fifty percent of the elderly and 72 percent of respondents with incomes under $10,000 also said they might have to give up their phones if rates double. The reorganization plan is drawing increasing scrutiny from Congress and from state legislators.

Joint Center Board Appoints Three New Members

The Joint Center's board of governors has three new members: Bishop John Hurst Adams, Marian Wright Edelman, and Luther Hilton Foster.

Bishop Adams has served as the bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church since 1972. He is chairman of the Congress of National Black Churches and director of the Interdenominational Theological Center. Bishop Adams received his master's degree from the Boston University School of Theology.

Marian Wright Edelman has been president of the Children's Defense Fund since 1975. She is a trustee and chairman of the board of Spelman College. Ms. Edelman received her law degree from Yale University and has served as an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and as director of the Harvard University Center for Law and Education.

Luther Hilton Foster is chairman of the board of the Moton Memorial Institute in Washington, D.C. He holds several honorary degrees and is president emeritus of Tuskegee Institute.

Senate Passes King Holiday Bill

On October 19, 1983, the Senate voted 78 to 22 to make Dr. Martin Luther King's birthday the nation's tenth federal holiday. Its passage followed two days of intense and often bitter debate. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was the main opponent of the legislation. The House passed the bill in August, and President Reagan signed it on November 2.

Legislation to create a national holiday in memory of Dr. King has been before the U.S. Congress for 15 years. Congressman John Conyers (D-MI) of the Congressional Black Caucus introduced the first bill in April 1968, four days after Dr. King's assassination in Memphis; other bills have been introduced every year since then. The closest a bill had come to passage was in 1979, when the bill fell four votes short of passage in the House.

The holiday will be observed on the third Monday in January, starting in 1986.

The Gender Gap, Continued

The widely noted "gender gap" in support for Ronald Reagan is found even among blacks, who give the president the lowest approval ratings of any group. Sixteen percent of black men but only 6 percent of women approve of President Reagan's job performance, according to the Gallup survey.

Women overall have given President Reagan lower job approval ratings in all the national Gallup surveys since he took office in 1980. The recent boost in the president's approval ratings following the invasion of Granada and the attack in Lebanon came entirely from men, according to the ABC News/*Washington Post poll*. Reagan is no more popular with women now than he was before the actions—49 percent of women approve of his job performance, compared to 67 percent of men.

Among the Democratic candidates for presidential nominees, the only one with a gender gap is Senator John Glenn. The Garth Analysis found that 34 percent of men and 27 percent of women support Glenn. But 23 percent of women are undecided, as compared to 10 percent of men.

Two New JCPS Publications

Wealth and Economic Status: A Perspective on Racial Inequity, by William P. O'Hare, uses information on wealth (accumulated assets) to compare the economic status of blacks and whites. The more commonly used income measure suggests that blacks as a group have reached 60 percent of parity with whites, but blacks have only one-third as much wealth as whites. O'Hare, senior research associate at the Joint Center, examines differences in wealth accumulation between blacks and whites for a range of assets, from income and property to savings and investments. *Wealth and Economic Status* also looks at changes in black and white wealth accumulation between 1967 and 1979.

Race and Political Strategy, edited by Thomas E. Cavanagh, research associate at the Joint Center, is based on proceedings of a JCPS roundtable discussion on the impact of race in electoral contests between black and white candidates. Roundtable participants included black candidates who ran in the 1982 elections and their assistants, political consultants, pollsters, and academic researchers. Their discussions centered on three issues that confront black candidates: strategic choices, use of campaign technologies, and grass-roots organizing.

Mayor Andrew Young of Atlanta says in his introduction to *Race and Political Strategy*, "Any black man or woman involved in politics should draw a measure of moral support as well as practical insight from this book. . . . Everyone interested in the political process will enjoy the give-and-take."

Copies of both publications are available for $4.95 each, prepaid, from the Joint Center.

FOURTH NATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE

Sponsored by:
Congressional Black Caucus
Joint Center for Political Studies
Judicial Council of the National Bar Association
National Association of Black County Officials
National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials
National Black Caucus of State Legislators
National Caucus of Black School Board Members
National Conference of Black Mayors

Black elected officials from all levels of government and all parts of the country will meet in Washington, D.C., from February 29 to March 3, 1984, for the *Fourth National Policy Institute*. The institute's sponsors—the seven national organizations of black elected officials and the Joint Center for Political Studies—issued a call to the meeting on November 9.

The political climate of the last few years and the forthcoming presidential campaign give this meeting special significance. It will provide an opportunity for the 5,400 black elected officials in the nation to establish a strong network, share ideas on policy and strategies for governance, and demonstrate to the rest of the country their substantial political presence.

The institute will include seminars on public policy and the political process, caucuses by level of office, and plenary sessions at which resolutions may be proposed, discussed, and adopted. Though the institute is nonpartisan and will not endorse any candidates, it can be expected to have a strong impact on the larger political arena.

Seminars will feature elected officials with expertise on specific subjects, political scientists and commentators, federal officials, and other knowledgeable professionals. They will examine how public policies affect governments at the national, state, and local levels, with particular attention to the interests of blacks and to the actions elected officials can take to address the concerns of their constituents. On the issue of employment, for example, local problems will be examined in the context of large-scale economic and social trends, and possible remedies will be weighed. Among other issues to be discussed are U.S. trade, the environment, education, and the black family.

Another set of seminars will focus on ways to increase and improve minority political participation, including voter mobilization, campaign strategies, and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. Workshops will provide concrete information on federal and state initiatives in resource development and on resources available in the private sector. Representatives of federal and state agencies will discuss programs in housing, transportation, social service delivery, and community and economic development. Special attention will be given to strategic planning for local governments. Other highlights of the institute include a caucus for women officials, a reception hosted by Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry, and the JCPS Seventh Annual Dinner, whose theme will be "A Salute to Black Elected Officials."

The registration fee is $90 for black elected officials and $200 for observers. The fee covers all events except the JCPS dinner. For further information, please call 202 626-3534, or write Fourth National Policy Institute, 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20004.

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

Annual rate of increase in number of black elected officials, 1971–1983.

Number of Black Elected Officials Jumps 8.6 Percent

The largest increase since 1976 is a sign of the recent surge in black political activism.

Martin Luther King, Jr.: An Honorable Man

Opponents of the King holiday raised doubts that should have been put to rest long ago; here, a noted King scholar sets the record straight.

The Civil Rights Commission "Double Cross"

For the first time, a U.S. president attempted to alter the composition of the commission; then, after a compromise resolution was reached, the administration reneged.

Plus—

A Special Report on Blacks in the Military
—Officer Attrition Rates
—Black Fliers

Joint Center for Political Studies

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Perspective

In a few weeks, the nation's black elected officials will assemble in Washington to develop their agenda for the 1984 elections and to map political strategies to implement as much of that agenda as possible.

Their National Policy Institute is both timely and necessary. By convening February 29-March 3, the institute has an opportunity to inject black perspectives into the primaries and into the elections that follow. The institute is necessary because, as four recent New York Times/CBS News polls found, black Americans are less optimistic about the future than whites, and the nation's policymakers need to know why this is so. Black elected officials, whose numbers are on a dramatic increase again (see page 8), can make a powerful statement on this subject.

The institute is timely and necessary for yet another reason. During the past decade, and especially since 1982, black Americans have demonstrated a strong and growing commitment to use the political process to achieve further progress in race relations. Black elected officials must provide leadership for this new thrust of the civil rights movement.

All of these are goals that the institute sponsors had in mind when they called for a national conference in early 1984. The sponsors represent all 5,600 black elected officials:

—Congressional Black Caucus
—Judicial Council of the National Bar Association
—National Association of Black County Officials
—National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials
—National Black Caucus of State Legislators
—National Caucus of Black School Board Members
—National Conference of Black Mayors

I am pleased that the Joint Center, which was conceived at a similar meeting in 1969, is also a sponsor of the institute and is serving as its convenor.

Through workshops and plenaries, the institute will tackle some of the most pressing problems confronting black America and indeed the nation as a whole. For example:

- Black unemployment rates have been twice those of whites for several decades, and only in the last six months has the rate for blacks begun to fall—long after the unemployment rate for whites commenced its decline.
- Virtually half of black families are headed by single women, and 57.4 percent of black female headed households are in poverty.
- The poor quality of public education available to most black children reduces opportunity. Blacks are disproportionately represented among the 72 million Americans who are functionally illiterate.

A Policy Framework for Racial Justice, which the Joint Center published last year, identifies the economy, the black family, and education as three fundamental problem areas that must be addressed in order to usher the disproportionately large number of excluded blacks into the mainstream of American society. The institute will explore new policy approaches to these knotty—but not insoluble—problems, and others.

The institute enjoys the enthusiastic support of prominent blacks from business, labor, academic, and civil rights circles, many of whom have agreed to serve on its Advisory Committee, which Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles and Percy Sutton, chairman of Inner City Broadcasting, will co-chair.

Occurring as it does on the eve of the 1984 primary season, the Fourth National Policy Institute offers an excellent opportunity for black officials to articulate their concerns and draw attention to the distressing trends I mentioned above. Although the institute will be nonpartisan and will make no endorsements, I do expect it to influence the agendas of both political parties and many candidates. Participants will surely voice their constituents' concerns as well as their own, and the views and votes of the black electorate are or should be matters of considerable interest to all office-seekers in 1984.

Eddie N. Williams
President

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Martin Luther King, Jr.: An Honorable Man

by David J. Garrow

(In 1986, America will begin to honor Martin Luther King, Jr.—and the ideals he stood for—with a national holiday. In 1984, an appropriate way to recognize his birthday is to set the record straight, once and for all, on the charges and innuendoes that continue to be made by opponents of the holiday. These charges have been proven false and should not be allowed to detract from the celebration of King's contributions.

Dr. Garrow is the author of The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. *(W. W. Norton, 1981) and* Protest at Selma *(Yale U. Press, 1978). He is assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill.)*

Establishment of a federal holiday to honor Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. occasioned a fresh public debate over stale accusations first made by segregationists more than two decades ago. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) unsuccessfully tried to block Senate passage of the holiday bill by alleging that Communist influence had underlain King's civil rights efforts, that King's personal conduct made him undeserving of national honor, and that King's political beliefs had been so radical as to be subversively un-American. Widely syndicated columnists such as James J. Kilpatrick dredged up similar claims, and even President Reagan flippantly suggested that the full truth about King's real tenets was not yet known.

Ultimately, the Senate voted 78 to 22 in favor of the holiday, and the president signed the measure into law. But the charges against King have been left clouding the air, and they deserve to be clearly refuted for the record. Senator Helms's remarks and Kilpatrick's assertions each were replete with errors, and even President Reagan's public comment betrayed ignorance of the relevant facts.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation had conducted an extensive investigation of King between 1962 and 1968, which focused on the same matters that Helms highlighted. The tapes and other records from the FBI's investigation were sealed for 50 years in 1977, to protect Dr. King and his family from further invasion of privacy. Helms argued that all these materials—principally tape recordings obtained from hidden "bugs" in King's hotel rooms—would have to be placed on the open record before any proper evaluation of King could take place. He unsuccessfully sought to persuade a federal judge to order the release of such tapes and transcripts. Helms's undertaking was both disingenuous and blind to evidence that disproves his basic accusations.

Communist Ties?

Helms's foremost allegation was that King "kept around him as his principal advisers and associates certain individuals who were taking their orders and direction from a foreign power," namely the Soviet Union. Helms also suggested that "King may have had an explicit but clandestine relationship with the Communist party or its agents to promote through his own stature, not the civil rights of blacks or social justice and progress, but the totalitarian goals and ideology of communism." Columnist Kilpatrick sounded a similar note, asserting that many of King's "close associates" were Communists and that King himself had been affiliated with the "notorious Highlander Folk School, a Communist training center."

Some of these statements are blatantly false. Several of the people whom Kilpatrick labeled as "close associates" were only passing acquaintances of King's, and at least one—a man named Paul Crouch—King never met. The extent of King's association with the Highlander School was to deliver a speech there once, and the school was never a "Communist training center," a conclusion even the FBI voiced privately when segregationists such as George Wallace and Ross Barnett trumpeted the charge back in 1963.

Helms focused on two figures who were, in fact, associates of Dr. King, one-time Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) employee Jack O'Dell and Stanley Levison, a white New York attorney who served as one of King's most important political advisers for more than a decade without ever emerging as a public figure.

O'Dell's past ties to the Communist party had been the subject of FBI-planted news stories in 1962 and 1963, but his SCLC job never made him one of King's "principal advisers and associates." Levison *was* one of King's top confidants and also, as the FBI knew, had been involved in the most important financial affairs of the American Communist party in the early 1950s—well before his acquaintance with King. The FBI had lost interest in Levison by 1955, when his Communist party activity ended, but in 1962, the bureau became aware that Levison had now become a close friend of the famous young civil rights leader. Although the bureau had no evidence that Levison was speaking for anyone but himself in his relationship with King, it concluded that the presence of such a man in King's entourage was a serious "national security" problem. As former assistant FBI director Charles D. Brennan, who was intimately involved in the King probe, put it in a recent issue of *Conservative Digest,* the FBI operated "on the assumption that Soviet direction must have been behind Levison's move from the Communist party to Martin Luther King."

Their fears aroused, the FBI asked Attorney General Robert Kennedy for permission to wiretap Levison's home and office, which Kennedy granted. Although those wiretaps remained in place for more than seven years—even after Dr. King's assassination—the FBI never found any evidence to support its assumption that Levison was representing foreign interests in his relationship with King or influencing King in subversive ways.

Extensive proof of this fact *is* publicly available. First, all of the FBI's accounts of Levison's wiretapped phone conversations, which included hundreds between him and King, have been released by the bureau in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Therefore, although the tapes from the FBI's electronic surveillance of King himself are sealed, the material most relevant to any supposed "Communist influence" upon King—

(Continued on page 5)

The Civil Rights Commission Double Cross

by Muriel Morisey Spence

(The author is national legislative counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union, Washington office.)

On December 8, 1983, representatives from major civil rights organizations—including women's rights advocates, predominately black organizations, and Hispanics—held a press conference to denounce the White House and Senate Republicans for "double-crossing" them. The subject was a compromise agreement to preserve the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights—a compromise that had been worked out over weeks of strenuous negotiations among Senate leaders, the White House, and civil rights groups. Then, after the legislation had been signed at the eleventh hour and it was too late to do anything about it, the administration violated the nonlegislative understandings that had been part of the agreement.

The 26-year-old Civil Rights Commission has played a key role in federal civil rights policy. Although it has no enforcement or regulatory duties, its status as an independent and objective fact-finding and policy evaluation agency gives it special credibility. Over the years, many of its recommendations have become permanent civil rights laws or have been incorporated into the operating regulations of civil rights agencies. But in recent months, the commission has been close to extinction and its independence put in grave jeopardy.

The Historic Role of the Commission

The Civil Rights Commission was established by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to research, analyze, and report on the state of civil rights in the United States. No other federal agency serves such an investigatory function in the area of civil rights. The commission has published over 700 reports, which have played major roles in the evaluation and formulation of federal civil rights policy. Throughout its history, it has been forthright in criticizing civil rights enforcement practices and policies that it found lacking. Nevertheless, Republican and Democratic presidents alike have sought to preserve the unique integrity and independence of the commission.

The relationship between the commission and the administration, Congress, and the civil rights community continued in relative harmony for 26 years, until President Reagan decided to dismiss commission members who have been vocal in their criticism of administration policies. In November 1981, the White House notified then Chairman Arthur S. Flemming and Vice Chairman Stephen Horn that they would be replaced. The president nominated Clarence N. Pendleton, a black Republican who had been head of the San Diego Urban League, as chairman and Mary Louise Smith, former chairwoman of the Republican National Committee, as a member of the commission. The Senate confirmed both nominees in March 1982.

In February 1982, the White House announced its intention to nominate the Reverend B. Sam Hart of Philadelphia, a black Republican—reportedly to replace Commissioner Jill Ruckelshaus, a white Republican appointed by President Jimmy Carter. Protests over Hart's lack of appropriate credentials grew so persistent and widespread that he withdrew his name before ever being formally nominated. Then the administration sent up three more names: Robert Destro, Nicholas Dombalis, and Guadalupe Quintinilla, to replace Commissioners Mary Frances Berry, Blandina Cardenas Ramirez, and Murray Saltzman. Although the nominations received Senate Judiciary Committee approval, the full Senate did not act on the names before the end of the 97th Congress.

In May 1983, the White House renewed its efforts to replace Commissioners Berry, Ramirez, and Saltzman. Destro, a law professor, was renominated, and the White House offered two new names instead of Dombalis and Quintinilla—Morris Abram, a well-known lawyer and former president of Brandeis University, and John Bunzel, of Stanford University's Hoover Institute. White House officials expressed their hope that these new appointees would give the commission a more conservative cast in line with President Reagan's views—especially on the issues of affirmative action and busing as remedies for discrimination in employment and education. The administration did not state any reasons for dissatisfaction with the commissioners to be replaced, but the three had been consistently critical of the administration's policies and enforcement activities in these areas.

The president's actions marked an unprecedented attempt to ensure that a majority of the commission supports his administration's civil rights policies. Even though the law creating the commission had never spelled out specific terms for commissioners or stated the conditions for their replacement, every president had understood and honored the congressional intention to let the commissioners work without fear of politicallly motivated retaliation for their views and actions. In the only previous presidential effort to alter the commission, the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, second chairman of the commission, was notified in 1973 that President Nixon planned to name a new chairman. However, no attempt was made to remove Hesburgh from the commission. Hesburgh later resigned for personal reasons.

Congress criticized President Reagan's actions. During Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nominees in July, Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-DE), who is an *opponent* of school busing and affirmative action goals and timetables, said "This debate is not about busing, not about quotas. That is a smokescreen. The administration knows if we ever focus on its civil rights policy, then white America will find its policies abysmal."

Senators Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-MD) and Arlen Specter (R-PA), members of the Judiciary Committee, urged that the nominations be withdrawn, because the circumstances under which they had occurred tainted the independence and integrity of the commission. Representatives of more than 20 civil rights groups testified that if the nominations were not withdrawn, they should be opposed as a group. The civil rights advocates withheld comment on the individual qualifications of the nomi-

(Continued on page 6)

Black Officers: A Special Report

Officer Attrition

by Edwin Dorn

(Dr. Dorn is deputy director of research at the Joint Center and is in charge of the center's clearinghouse on blacks in the military.)

Two factors affect the racial composition of the military's officer corps: the ratio of blacks to non-blacks entering the service as officers, and the ratio of blacks to non-blacks leaving the service. A review of statistical trends for the period from 1972 to 1982 reveals that the officer corps began attracting more blacks during the early part of that period. This growth has slowed in the past three or four years, suggesting that the services may have difficulty increasing black officer representation much beyond the current level of 5.6 percent.

The dotted line in Figure 1 indicates that the representation of blacks in the lowest officer grade, O1, was less than 2 percent in 1972, peaked at 7.5 percent in 1979, then declined to 6.6 percent in 1982. The solid line shows that the representation of blacks in all officer grades also rose, but more slowly. This slower rise for all officers is attributable to the military's rigid promotion system; the trend for all officers normally traces that for O1s, but with a lag of several years time. For example, it takes about ten years to climb through the ranks from 01 (second lieutenant) to O4 (major) so increases in the number of black majors will not be apparent for a few years.

Those who *are* selected for promotion will come from the O1s represented by the dotted line in Figure 2. Thus, the attrition rate among these junior officers is a key indicator of the future representation of blacks in the higher officer grades.

Attrition rates have declined dramatically during the past decade for black and non-black officers, and the combined attrition rate for blacks in all grades, from lieutenant to colonel has been lower than that for non-black officers. It would appear, then, that the services have been moving in the right direction.

A Worrisome Trend

One trend, however, should give us cause for concern: the dip in the percentage of blacks in the O1 grade since 1979. We can examine this trend more closely by considering the



Figure 1: Blacks as a percentage of all officers and officers in the 01 grade, 1972-1982.

Source: Department of Defense.



Figure 2: Blacks as a percentage of officers in the 01 grade, by service, 1972-1982.

Source: Department of Defense.

various services' recruiting efforts independently. Figure 2 tracks the representation of black O1s within each of the four services.

Clearly, the Army achieved the most dramatic recruiting gains: blacks have been approximately 10 percent of officers in the entering grade since around 1977. The Air Force made steady gains in the early through mid-1970s, but a decline in the percentage of blacks in the O1 grade began in 1979. Black officer representation in the Navy and Marine Corps has improved, but in an uneven and undramatic way.

Generally, recruitment gains can be traced to two factors. One is an increase in the recruitment pool. Officers must be college graduates, and during the 1970s, black representation among college graduates increased considerably. Indeed, the representation of blacks in the officer corps is roughly equal to the representation of blacks in the college-educated population, a factor that could in itself constrain future increases in the black officer cadre. Another factor is that all the services launched vigorous efforts to recruit more black officers. Those efforts were stimulated partly by the services' commitment to equal opportunity, and partly by the need—especially in the immediate post-Vietnam period—to compensate for a reduced interest in military service among whites.

The differences among individual services are probably attributable to the nature of their recruitment efforts, to differences in the ways in which they are perceived by blacks, and to differences in standards. For example, the Army recruits most of its officers through college-based ROTC programs and gets about half of its black officers from historically black colleges. Further, the Army has long been perceived as relatively hospitable to blacks.

By contrast, the Navy relies very heavily on the U.S. Naval Academy to fill its officer ranks. Admission to the service academies is highly competitive, with strong emphasis on mathematical and scientific aptitude. Blacks, on average, score lower than whites on standardized achievement tests, and blacks continue to be underrepresented among students majoring in mathematics, engineering, and the physical sciences. Thus, the pool of blacks who qualify for the Navy probably is smaller than the pool who qualify for the Army.

However, all of the services have now begun to require that their officers display greater scientific skills. This, combined with social and economic forces that have made the military more attractive to whites, may help to explain the recent decline in representation of blacks among officers entering the armed forces.



Figure 3: Attrition rates for black and nonblack officers in the 01 grade, 1972-1982.

Source: Department of Defense.

Attrition of O1s

Another cause for concern is that the attrition rate of black O1s has become higher than the attrition rate of white O1s (Figure 3). Here, too, the specifics vary from service to service (the difference appears most pronounced in the Air Force), but clearly the attrition rate contributes to the dip in the representation of blacks at the O1 level and results in relatively fewer blacks than non-blacks being available for promotion into the higher grades. (For the past three years, attrition rates have also been higher for blacks than whites at the O4 (major) level; this phenomenon is too recent to be judged an important trend, but it bears watching.)

To date, no systematic analyses have been conducted that would allow us to explain with confidence the factors underlying the attrition trends. However, interviews with informed observers within and outside the Defense Department have turned up a pair of plausible theories. One is that, in their eagerness to attract blacks into the officer corps, the services may have "dipped too deeply into the pool." That is, they may have altered educational achievement standards in order to enlist blacks who would not have qualified under other circumstances. These deficiencies could manifest themselves in unsatisfactory performance very early in the officers' careers.

A second explanation, and one that would gain increasing importance as officers moved up through the ranks, is that many black officers may have failed to master the subtleties of career advancement. Young black officers, who frequently are the first in their families to enter professional jobs, may master a narrow range of job skills but fail to display the proper combination of leadership, initiative, conformity, and career planning needed to advance into more senior and more responsible positions. This explanation would be consistent with analyses by economist Bernard Anderson and others of the experience of blacks in the corporate world. These more subtle bureaucratic skills, of course, are not taught as part of a regular college curriculum; they are gleaned through socialization in a middle-class professional environment. Futhermore, it may be that many black junior officers are not finding mentors among more experienced senior officers, whose assessments, advice, and concrete assistance can be crucial to long-term success.

Although both of these explanations are plausible, it must be re-emphasized that neither is proven. For example, even though blacks tend to display lower educational achievement than whites, it does not necessarily follow that those who are leaving the military are in fact the low achievers. It is possible that much of the black attrition is attributable to highly talented officers who find attractive alternatives in the civilian sector.

In recent months, several Pentagon officials have indicated concern about the issues discussed above, particularly attrition. However, with a few specific exceptions—for example, black attrition from flight training programs—the issues appear not to have been studied systematically. Until they are, it may be difficult for the services to effect dramatic improvements in the representation of blacks in the officer corps.

Black Fliers

by Wade S. Gatling

(Colonel Gatling is a senior fellow at the Joint Center, on a one-year assignment from the Air Force under an ongoing agreement between JCPS and the U.S. Defense Dept.)

The capture and dramatic release of Lieutenant Robert O. Goodman focused the country's attention on a black Navy flier. Interestingly, Lieutenant Goodman is one of only about 260 blacks among some 18,000 Navy fliers. Four decades after the military began training blacks as airmen, the percentage of black fliers in all the services remains low—even lower than the overall percentage of black officers.

Of all the military occupational specialties, flying is one of the most critical and prestigious. Without diminishing the importance of other combat assignments, one can say that there is something special about people who fly, particularly the officers who pilot and navigate modern, high performance jet fighters. They are men (women are prohibited from flying aircraft in combat) who must have near-perfect vision, the stamina to withstand physical stresses that would render most people unconscious, the intellectual skill to master highly complex machines, and the reflexes to make instantaneous decisions at speeds where a second's delay can mean death.

Not everyone who flies faces such exacting performance standards, of course. Many pilots fly other types of aircraft, such as bombers, tankers, cargo planes, and helicopters, in which they undertake demanding missions, but at slower speeds. And some people who fly—Air Force navigators and Naval flight officers, for example—have responsibilities other than piloting, such as navigation, bombing, and electronic counter-measures. Still, everyone involved in flying must meet certain rigorous physical and academic standards.

Thus it is not surprising that officers with flight experience are well represented among top military leaders. In the Air Force, 73 percent of the generals are pilots, even though only 25 percent of Air Force officers as a whole are pilots. In the Navy, where only 17 percent of the officers are trained as pilots, 31 percent of the admirals wear pilot's wings. And in the Marine Corps, 34 percent of the generals are pilots, compared to 22 percent of all Marine officers. Only in the Army, where flying must compete with the likes of Infantry, Armor, and Artillery, is the pattern absent.

Despite the allure of flying and its potential as a path to the highest ranks, there are very few blacks in military aviation. Currently, blacks constitute only 1.8 percent of military personnel with flying specialties, although 5.6 percent of all commissioned officers—the source of most flight trainees—are black. Table 1 shows the extent of black participation in aviation by service.

There are two fundamental reasons why blacks are underrepresented in the flying corps. First, very few blacks enter flight training, as shown in Table 2. For the periods covered in the table, less than 3 percent of all student pilots were black. The comparable percentage for navigators and flight officers was only slightly above 3 percent. These statistics reveal nothing, of course, about the numbers of blacks who applied for flight training, but did not qualify, or who had an interest in flying, but did not apply.

The reasons so few blacks enter flight training are undoubtedly complex. No doubt a key factor influencing occupational preference is personal background. People who, because of socioeconomic constraints or cultural influences, have little contact with flying as a profession are not likely to view it as a readily accessible vocation. A greater proportion of blacks than whites fall into this category.

Consequently, blacks tend not to include flying among their professional preferences, and the resulting lack of role models within the black community helps perpetuate this tendency. To counter this trend, the services have developed awareness programs to acquaint minorities with the full range of military occupations, including aviation.

Attrition

The other reason for the low number of blacks in aviation is their high rate of attrition from flight training programs—a rate which significantly exceeds that of their white counterparts (see Table 3). In the Army and Air Force, blacks failed to complete pilot training at nearly two and one-half times the rate of whites. The attrition rates of black students in Air Force navigator and Naval flight officer training also significantly exceeded those of whites.

Concern over these differences has prompted Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to order a study of black performance in flight training. To begin the study, each service is reviewing the performance of its flight students. Although all the data are not yet in, some interesting findings have begun to emerge.

The Army examined a number of factors to assess their accuracy as predictors of success. Age was found to be the most accurate predictor: the older the student, the less the likelihood of success. The score on a written flight aptitude test, too, was found to be a reliable predictor. Black flying candidates were disproportionately represented among the older candidates (28-30), and on the average, their flight aptitude scores were significantly lower than those of whites.

The Army found that most students, both black and white, left the training program during the same phases and for the same reasons—primarily "flying deficiency," which means unsatisfactory performance in the actual piloting of an aircraft.

Concerned Pioneers

One group with a particular interest in the attrition issue is the Tuskegee Airmen, Inc. Made up of black aviators and flying support personnel who served in World War II, the organization traces its roots to the Tuskegee Army Airfield in Alabama, where, in July 1941, the Army Air Corps initiated a program of pilot training for blacks.

Veterans of this early program established the Tuskegee Airmen, Inc. in 1972 to prevent their activities and accomplishments from being forgotten and to encourage minority youth to pursue careers in aviation and aviation sciences. The Airmen have included such servicemen as General Daniel "Chappie" James, the first black four-star general in military history, and Lieutenant General B. O. Davis, Jr., the first black Air Force general. Two JCPS board members—Wendell Freeland, Esq. (chairman), and Percy E. Sutton, chairman of the Inner City Broadcasting Corporation and former president of the Borough of Manhattan—are members.

The Tuskegee Airmen's concern that young blacks succeed in flying careers prompted the group's president, Jean Esquerre, to write Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger about the "unacceptably high" attrition rate among blacks who enter flight training. In his reply, Secretary Weinberger acknowledged his own dissatisfaction with the attrition rate of blacks in flight training and pledged to address the issue. The study discussed here is the result of that pledge.

Table 1. Percentage of Blacks Among Military Flight Personnel (Oct.-Nov. 1983)

	Pilots	Air Force Navigators/ Naval Flight Officers
Air Force	1.1	2.7
Navy	1.3	1.8
Marine Corps	1.1	1.8
Army	2.9	—

Table 2. Student Pilots (No./% of Black-White Total)

	Air Force	Navy*	Army
White	6573/97.9%	3620/98%	2040/94.1%
Black	142/2.1%	72/2%	127/5.9%

Note: Air Force data: Oct. 79-Apr. 83; Navy: Oct.80-May 83; Army: Feb. 81-Feb. 83.

*Navy analysis does not include Marine Corps data.

Table 3. Student Pilot Attrition Rates

	Air Force	Navy*	Army
White	19.9%	32.3%	10.9%
Black	52.1%	34.7%	26.8%

Note: Air Force data: Oct. 79-Apr. 83; Navy: Oct. 80-May 83; Army: Feb. 81-Feb.83.

*Navy analysis does not include Marine Corps data.

Because of the small black enrollment, though, the net effect of black losses was two and one-half times that of white losses.

The Air Force found that the pilots and navigator aptitude scores of black flight students on average lagged significantly behind those of their white counterparts. Moreover, significantly fewer blacks possessed technical degrees, which are usually reliable predictors of success. But in addition, a much higher proportion of blacks than whites with pilot aptitude scores in the mid- to upper-percentile ranges failed to complete pilot training, for reasons not yet known. And there were two attrition categories in which the percentage of blacks who failed to complete the training exceeded that of whites: piloting deficiency (blacks, 66.2 percent; whites, 55.4 percent) and academic deficiency (for pilots, 9.5 percent for blacks versus 2.2 percent for whites, and for navigators, 17.9 percent for blacks versus 9.9 percent for whites). As with the Army, the net effect of the black losses was especially heavy, since the number of black pilot and navigator candidates was so small.

The Navy's student pilot attrition rates for blacks and whites were much closer than those of the other services. In fact, during the period under review, the Navy's black attrition rate was at times lower than the white rate. The reasons for the rate fluctuations and general closeness are not known. The attrition categories in which black elimination rates exceeded the Navy average were: piloting deficiency (36 percent for blacks versus 25.4 percent for whites); academic deficiency (for pilots, 16 percent for blacks versus 7.2 percent for whites, and for Naval flight officers, 26.5 percent for blacks versus 12.2 percent for whites); and deficiency in practical application (for Naval flight officers, 32.4 percent for blacks versus 23.8 percent for whites).

The reasons for differences in performance between black and white flight students will certainly remain a principal focus of the military studies. On the basis of analyses completed thus far, however, the services believe that the flight training programs themselves do not discriminate against blacks. They attribute differences in attrition rates to differences in qualifications of applicants. Fewer blacks enter flight programs possessing the "success factors" or attributes most often associated with completing the training, such as high flight aptitude scores and a scientific or technical background.

Another factor that can be of considerable importance is family background. For example, flight candidates who have the support of family members associated with aviation are likely to have some advantage as they approach flight training. A 1976 Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) study of similarities and differences among pilot trainees supports this view. That study reported a very significant distinction between the responses of graduates and nongraduates concerning their reasons for entering pilot training.

Graduates cited as a major factor in their decision to pursue a flying career the influence of a parent or relative who was a pilot or in the Air Force. Among those who failed to complete pilot training, this reason was given far less frequently. The study saw several factors as contributing to the success of graduates: (a) the long-term, positive motivation toward flying provided by these parents or relatives, (b) realistic expectations of flying requirements, and (c) good understanding and support from their parents. The influence of parents and relatives with Air Force or pilot experience generated more realistic goals and expectations regarding the pilot training program. The AFHRL finding suggests that flying aspirants whose parents or relatives are not associated with aviation may lack some advantage as they enter flight training.

Another factor that probably bears on performance in flight training is a candidate's academic background. Students—whether black or white—who graduate from college with less than a strong proficiency in verbal and quantitative skills probably have difficulty keeping up with the rigorous curriculum and rapid pace of flight training. Additionally, for some black students, most notably those from predominantly black colleges, having to adapt quickly to an unfamiliar social and cultural (as well as geographical) environment may give rise to pressures that hamper learning. If the student is the only black (or one of very few blacks) in a class, the problem is compounded. Undoubtedly, other revelant factors will emerge as the services grapple with this issue.

As reported in the March 1983 *Focus*, the services have redirected much of their recruiting effort toward individuals with scientific and technical skills. If they are successful in attracting better qualified black candidates to their flight training programs, the attrition rates may decline. But since very few black college students receive degrees in scientific and technical fields (less than 7 percent in 1981), attracting such students will be a major challenge to the military. Among the initiatives undertaken to meet this objective is the use of military scholarships and expanded publicity and recruiting efforts targeted at well-qualified blacks in both the military and civilian sectors. And the training process itself is being studied to determine ways of improving the performance of blacks and other minorities.

The attrition data suggest, and discussions with service representatives confirm, that increasing the cadre of blacks in aviation will be no easy task. But failure to solve the problem, or at least significantly improve the performance of black students, will mean continuing unacceptably high attrition rates, with all their implications.

Furthermore, students who fail to complete flight training are not always retained by the service. Retention depends on a number of factors, including source of commission, whether a student is on scholarship, the area of the student's undergraduate degree, and the needs of the armed services. When black officers who are eliminated from flight training do not qualify for retention, service efforts to increase minority officer representation are hampered.

Finally, if blacks are to reach the highest military grades, their underrepresentation in such highly regarded areas as aviation must be overcome.

Martin Luther King, Jr. . . .

(Continued from page 3)

records of his conversations with Levison—is already publicly available.

What's more, the Ford administration established two Justice Department task forces to review and report on the surveillance materials subsequently put under court seal. Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger headed the first probe and personally reviewed the relevant recordings; he said later that "there was nothing in the files, either in tapes or written records . . . that indicated that Martin Luther King was a Communist or Communist sympathizer, or in any way knowingly or negligently let himself be used by Communists." The director of the second inquiry, attorney Fred G. Folsom, reached similar conclusions after *his* private review of the now-sealed documents. "King was no Communist," he explained, and "the material did not deal with politics or philosophical views; it was of a personal nature and highly irrelevant."

King's Private Life

The conservatives also had a second line of attack: that the details of King's private life should be aired publicly before according him any national honor. But if no famous American who is reliably believed to have had extramarital relationships were worthy of honor, the list of leaders barred would be a very long one indeed. In fact, most recent presidents—Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—would be on such a list. Thomas Jefferson—whom Senator Helms volunteered as his "favorite" candidate for a national holiday—is strongly suspected to have had an intimate relationship with one of his female slaves. In short, many critics seem eager to apply to King a harsh standard that is not applied to other political figures.

No other American leader has ever been the target of the sort of hostile and extensive electronic scrutiny directed against King. In his formal report to then-Attorney General Edward H. Levi, Pottinger decried the "illegal and improper investigative activities" the FBI had used in order to obtain such recordings and characterized the items as "scurrilous and immaterial to any proper law enforcement function or historic purpose." Also, there is no precedent at all in American history for judging the merits of a political career on bedroom recordings. Had Helms won release of the FBI's tapes, the original invasion of King's privacy through FBI surveillance would only have been compounded.

Subversive Politics?

The third line of right wing attack on King has been the charge that his actual political beliefs were dangerously subversive. Senator Helms charged that King's "action-oriented Marxism" can be uncovered in the texts of some of his public speeches. According to Helms, King's move beyond challenges to racial discrimination and his advocacy of an end to both domestic poverty and America's military involvement in Vietnam revealed him as an unpatriotic citizen. Helms concluded that King's "political views were those of a radical political minority" and hence undeserving of national honor.

King increasingly and strongly denounced economic injustice during the last few years of his life. He also called for decisive government action to end poverty and to provide jobs, adequate housing, quality education, and medical care for the millions of Americans who lacked these staples of life. More and more, he spoke about "the gulf between the haves and the have nots." Often, he sounded pessimistic about the possibilities for comprehensive change, and suggested there would have to be "a radical redistribution of economic and political power" in America. Occasionally, King went a step further, declaring that "something is wrong with capitalism" and that "maybe America must move toward a democratic socialism."

In the later years, King also vigorously criticized the war in Vietnam, denouncing America's military excesses and calling for an end to the United States' self-appointed role as policeman of the Third World. Racism, he often noted, could be seen not only in southern segregation and domestic economic injustice, but also in America's foreign policy from southeast Asia to southern Africa. At times, his attacks upon American conduct in Vietnam grew strong indeed. Mainstream newspapers such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* rebuked King for asserting that the United States was "the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today."

Some of King's phrases made many people uncomfortable, but history has shown that his early opposition to the Vietnam debacle was just as prescient as his advocacy of comprehensive government action to aid the nation's poor. King's opposition to war, his commitment to nonviolence, and his deep-seated desire to eliminate poverty might irk Jesse Helms, but none of King's positions, not even his harshest rhetoric, ever represented "action-oriented Marxism." As for his being part of "a radical political minority," King's policy preferences, both foreign and domestic, are ones that great segments of the American public have come to support in the years since his death.

Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), in a tribute to Dr. King published in the *Washington Post*, noted that progress can be made only by people who are willing to be in the dissenting minority. He quoted George Bernard Shaw: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world. The unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man." That King's political beliefs were not in the mainstream of his time is a sign of his greatness, not a flaw in his character.

All in all, the attempts to forestall a Martin Luther King holiday by discrediting King were based on allegations already proven false, aspects of his life irrelevant to the reasons for honoring him, and basic misunderstandings of his political program. By raising these erroneous objections, opponents have drawn attention away from the real significance of King's contribution and America's decision to honor it.

That contribution was indeed revolutionary—in both form and content. In form, because King used peaceful means in a violent world. In content, be-

(Continued on page 7)

The Civil Rights Commission . . .

(Continued from page 4)

nees, focusing instead on the issue of the commission's independence.

In August, the House of Representatives considered legislation to extend the commission's life beyond the scheduled termination date of September 30, 1983. By a vote of 286 to 128, the House adopted an amendment, offered by Representative Don Edwards (D-CA), prohibiting the removal of commissioners except for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. House members were well aware that this vote was a kind of referendum on the president's actions. Moments later, the House voted overwhelmingly to extend the commission's life.

In the Senate, controversy about the commission still centered on the pending three nominations sent up in May. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and civil rights groups worked together for weeks to develop a bipartisan compromise that would keep the commission alive and independent.

Compromise

By late October, it was clear that despite White House refusal to endorse any proposal satisfactory to Democrats, moderate Republicans, and the civil rights community, a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee and more than 60 senators in all were ready to support a compromise plan. The plan would have expanded the membership of the commission from six to eight members. The seats of the six incumbents would be saved, and the president would get two additional nominees. Convinced that a resolution of the difficult struggle was at hand, Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond (R-SC) said on the floor of the Senate that he would call the matter up for a vote in his committee on October 25.

Facing the virtual certainty of defeat, the president, on October 25, undertook a new move to control the commission: he fired Commissioners Berry, Ramirez, and Saltzman. His action not only sabotaged the carefully forged congressional compromise, but it left the commission even more in danger of complete extinction, for there was little time left to negotiate. The commission was already well into the 60-day period during which, by law, its only permitted activity was to shut down.

In response to the firings, Congress acted with unusual speed and resolution. Legislation to take the commission completely out of the executive branch of government gained the cosponsorship of 55 senators in six days. But Republican Senators Baker (TN), the Majority Leader; Dole (KS); and Domenici (NM) urged the civil rights community to work with them to develop a new compromise that would give the president some share in the appointment of commissioners.

The abrupt firings of October 25 left many civil rights advocates skeptical about any further efforts to compromise, but the desire to keep the commission alive was as strong as ever—provided the overriding goal of independence could be preserved. In addition, Senators Baker, Dole, and Domenici had demonstrated in the past that they were willing to engage in good-faith negotiations over civil rights issues. Finally, the 55 cosponsors would not have been enough votes to override a veto had Congress passed legislation the president disliked. For many, many hours during the second week of November, representatives of civil rights groups worked with them and Senators Biden (D-DE), Kennedy (D-MA), Specter (R-PA), Metzenbaum (D-OH), and their staffs. As always, fundamental principles guided the civil rights advocates:

—the independence of the commission must be ensured through the provision that no president could appoint a majority of the commissioners during any one term of office;

—the commissioners could be removed only for malfeasance or neglect of duty;

—these principles must apply to President Reagan as well as future presidents. Therefore, he would be entitled only to two new appointments, and the commissioners he had fired without cause would be retained. Retention of Commissioners Mary Louise Smith and Jill Ruckelshaus was also an essential element of every option discussed.

Commissioners Berry and Ramirez filed suit to keep the firings from taking effect, on the ground that the terminations were inconsistent with the independent character of the commission, and eventually, they obtained a court order that kept them in office.

On November 10, Senator Dole offered to civil rights groups a compromise agreement under which four commissioners would be presidentially appointed and four would be named by Congress. Neither the president nor Congress could appoint more than two commissioners from the same political party. Although the law would contain no specific names, Dole's proposal was premised on the understanding that President Reagan would reappoint Mary Louise Smith, the House Republican Minority Leader would recommend Jill Ruckelshaus to the Speaker for appointment, and Senator Baker, as Majority Leader, would recommend to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate that one Senate appointee be a Republican with strong civil rights credentials. Commissioner Pendleton would remain as a presidential appointment and the president would get to name two new people (presumably Abram and Bunzel). Commissioners Berry and Ramirez were expected to be the choices of Democrats in the House and Senate.

Civil rights groups accepted the proposal, and by late the night of the tenth, Senator Dole had obtained agreement from leading senators and representatives of both parties and from the White House. Senators Joseph Biden and Arlen Specter held a press conference on November 11, sharing with reporters the specifics of the compromise. Congress passed it the following week.

"Double Cross"

Then the agreement began to unravel. After a week, the White House expressed reservations about the constitutionality of the bill's provisions concerning the appointment of commissioners. Nonetheless, the president finally signed the bill at the last moment.

But on December 1, the White House said there

(Continued on page 7)

Telescope

Black Unemployment Rate Drops, Finally

The unemployment rate for blacks, which had been around 20 percent for more than a year, dropped in November to 17.3 percent, its lowest level since February 1982. When the overall unemployment rate began to decline, in December 1982, black unemployment did not budge. The black unemployment rate finally began to decline in September 1983, according to the U.S. Department of Labor's monthly report on employment. Most of the improvement has been among adult men.

However, the black unemployment rate remains more than twice that of whites, which declined from 8.2 percent in August to 7.3 percent in November.

New Black Political Action Committee Formed

A group of young black professionals throughout the nation has organized the 21st Century Institute for Political Action, an independent nonpartisan political action committee. The 21st Century Institute aims to transform the black community's economic strength into political power. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., it is attempting to raise funds nationally to provide financial support to candidates at the national, state, and local levels who are responsive to the concerns of the black community. It also plans to contribute to campaigns of black delegates to both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

Honorary chairpersons of the institute's introductory reception, held in November 1983, included Mary Berry, professor of history and law and former vice-chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Edward Brooke, former U.S. senator; and Ronald Dellums, Mickey Leland, and Parren Mitchell, members of the Congressional Black Caucus.

For more information, write the 21st Century Institute for Political Action, 1710 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009, or call (202) 462-2220.

Policy Framework Issues Set Before Congress

Eleanor Holmes Norton, testifying on behalf of the Joint Center before the U.S. House Budget Committee Task Force on Entitlements, Uncontrollables, and Indexing on October 27, 1983, stated that racism in America has seriously weakened the black family and urged policies and programs to improve black family formation and stability.

In summarizing for the committee the problems facing today's black families, Ms. Norton, professor of law at Georgetown University, stressed the growing number of poor black families headed by single women and the increasing number of black children being raised in these families. She listed three major areas that need to be addressed to strengthen black families: (1) redesign of welfare programs to include training and support that will allow young mothers eventually to graduate from the programs and become economically independent; (2) prevention of premature sex and early family formation on the part of young men and women so they can pursue education, training, and personal development; and (3) tools such as affirmative action in education, employment, and entrepreneurial opportunities to strengthen black husband-wife families.

Ms. Norton's testimony was based on the section on the black family in *A Policy Framework for Racial Justice*, a statement published by JCPS last June. *Policy Framework* was written by 30 prominent black scholars brought together by the Joint Center over the last two years to explore the problems confronting black Americans. The House committee expressed an interest in translating the *Policy Framework* recommendations into legislation—perhaps funding a model demonstration project—and will be working with Ms. Norton to devise an appropriate vehicle for sponsoring such legislation.

The Civil Rights Commission . . .

(Continued from page 6)

had been no agreement to reappoint Mary Louise Smith. According to Vice President Bush, the refusal of Ms. Smith to pledge support for the president's designation of chairman was the problem. Then, on December 7, Congressman Robert Michel, the House Republican Leader, chose Robert Destro for his recommendation instead of Jill Ruckelshaus.

These are the actions civil rights advocates called a "double-cross."

The events have been sobering for these advocates, who saw bipartisan efforts lead to passage of the civil rights legislation of the 60s, the 70s, and most recently, the Voting Rights Act extension of 1982. Such cooperation may be difficult or impossible to repeat.

And this is only one of the casualties of the Civil Rights Commission battle. The existence of any independent, nonpartisan, federal voice on civil rights has been left in doubt.

The existence of such a voice was the real issue in the struggle of the last few months—not perspectives on affirmative action, busing, or other aspects of the national civil rights effort. The question is whether the commission will be able to do the work it was created to do: "appraise the laws and policies of the federal government" with respect to civil rights. This work necessarily includes evaluating the policies of each administration. Such evaluations are meaningless if commissioners are replaced at will when they do not agree with those very policies.

How the Civil Rights Commission, as currently composed, will fulfill its original mandate remains to be seen. But it is not only the civil rights community that thinks the White House has failed to play by the rules, and the administration's actions will surely be a political issue in 1984.

Martin Luther King, Jr. . . .

(Continued from page 5)

cause he asked a hypocritical country to be true to its professed ideals. The revolution is not complete, but by designating the third Monday in January as a King holiday, the United States has taken a significant step toward recommitting itself to the ideals of justice and equality to which Martin Luther King, Jr. dedicated his own life.

Largest Increase in BEOs Since 1976

The number of black elected officials nationwide rose by 8.6 percent between July 1982 and July 1983, the Joint Center for Political Studies has found. As of July 1983, there were 5,606 black elected officials, up from 5,160 in July 1982.

The 1983 increase represents a dramatic turnaround in the trend of the last eight years. Although the number of black elected officials has increased every year, the *rate* of increase has been declining since the early 1970s, after the early spurt of progress following passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Last year's increase was only 2.4 percent.

The jump in the number of black elected officials is part of a general upsurge in black political activity. The number of registered black voters increased by almost 600,000 between 1980 and 1982; black turnout rose by 5.8 percent in the 1982 congressional elections (over the 1978 level); and 1983 saw highly visible campaigns by black candidates at several levels of government.

The South, which has 62 percent of the black elected officials in the country, had the largest net gain of any region—301 more black elected officials, an increase of 9.6 percent. But the Northeast, with 12 percent of black officials, had a greater rate of increase—14 percent. The states with the largest increases were Arkansas, with a net gain of 78, for a total of 297; New York, which gained 44; Oklahoma, 42; Illinois, 38; and Louisiana, 36. Mississippi still has the highest total number of black elected officials, 433—9 more than in 1982. (As usual, a small proportion of these gains represent officials who had been in office but were not known to the Joint Center in previous years.)

The number of black members of Congress increased from 18 to 21, or 16.7 percent. The number of black state legislators rose by 13.6 percent, and the number of black mayors, by 10.8 percent.

Once again, the increase in the number of female black elected officials was larger than the overall increase: 13.1 percent. As of July 1983, some 22 percent of all black elected officials—1,223—were women. By contrast, only about 10 percent of all elected officials are women.

The Joint Center has been counting black elected officials since 1970. In 1965, when the VRA was first passed, it is estimated there were fewer than 300 black elected officials in the country. Even at the new high, however, blacks hold only 1.1 percent of the elective offices in the country.

Change in Number of Black Elected Officials by Category of Office, 1970-1983

	Total BEOs		Federal	State	Substate regional	County	Municipal	Judicial/law enforcement	Education
Year	N	% Change	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
1970	1,469	—	10	169	—	92	623	213	362
1971	1,860	26.6	14	202	—	120	785	274	465
1972	2,264	21.7	14	210	—	176	932	263	669
1973	2,621	15.7	16	240	—	211	1,053	334	767
1974	2,991	14.2	17	239	—	242	1,360	340	793
1975	3,503	17.1	18	281	—	305	1,573	387	939
1976	3,979	13.6	18	281	30	355	1,889	412	994
1977	4,311	8.3	17	299	33	381	2,083	447	1,051
1978	4,503	4.5	17	299	26	410	2,159	454	1,138
1979	4,607	2.3	17	313	25	398	2,224	486	1,144
1980	4,912	6.6	17	323	25	451	2,356	526	1,214
1981	5,038	2.6	18	341	30	449	2,384	549	1,267
1982	5,160	2.4	18	336	35	465	2,451	563	1,266
1983	5,606	8.6	21 (16.7%)	379 (12.8%)	29 (-17.1%)	496 (6.7%)	2,697 (8.9%)	607 (7.8%)	1,377 (8.8%)

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